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We analyze a firm's job-assignment and worker-monitoring decisions when workers face occasional
crises. Firms prefer to assign good workers to a difficult task and to not employ bad workers. Firms
observe failures but only observe successfully resolved crises if they monitor the worker. If monitoring
costs are positive but sufficiently small, for a range of probabilities that the worker is good, the firm
assigns the worker to a low task (less sensitive to crises) and monitors her. At probabilities below this
range and not too much above it, she is assigned to the low task and not monitored. At high probabilities
of being good, she is assigned to the difficult task. We analyze the implications for internal labor markets
of the case where a worker has the same ex ante probability of being good at all firms and learning
is about ability at this particular firm.
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lang@bu.eduWe develop a model of monitoring and internal labor markets based on two key
elements. First, monitoring is primarily used to catch errors and to evaluate workers
and not, as assumed in the agency literature, primarily to deter shirking, stealing
or other forms of moral hazard. Second, in most jobs much of the work is routine
in the sense that it can be performed similarly by any worker who is reasonably
well-trained for the job. Worker quality is primarily about the ability to handle the
nonroutine elements of the job, which we call crises. We show that a model that
combines these elements can explain why in many jobs wages are largely determined
by initial human capital and seniority and that the model predicts or is consistent
with many of the regularities in the literature on internal labor markets.
In the base model, workers can be either good or bad. All workers can perform
routine tasks, but only good workers can solve crises. Workers may be assigned
to either of two tasks of which one is more productive under routine circumstances
but is also subject to more costly crises. After hiring a worker, ￿rms choose one
of three strategies: 1) place the worker in the higher productivity but more crisis-
sensitive task and hope for the best, 2) place him in the less sensitive task and
monitor his performance, or 3) place him in the less sensitive task and not monitor
his performance. Given the structure of the base model, monitoring workers in the
higher task is never optimal.
Initially we abstract from wages and the presence of an external labor market.
We consider only the optimal allocation of workers to task and optimal monitoring
of their performance. We show that if the cost of monitoring is ￿nite but su¢ ciently
small, then there are four assignment tiers. Workers whom the ￿rm believes are very
likely to be good are placed in the high task (group A). Those with a somewhat
lower probability of being good are not monitored. After some time, if they have
not been observed to mishandle a crisis, they are placed in the high-tier task (group
B). Below this tier, workers are monitored (group C). Once a crisis occurs, worker
quality is known, and the worker is assigned to the appropriate task. Finally, if
the probability that the worker is good is su¢ ciently low, the ￿rm again does not
monitor him (group D). However, unless its prior that the worker is good is 0, after
some time if the worker has not faced a crisis and failed, the ￿rm￿ s updated estimate
1of the probability that the worker is good becomes su¢ cient for the ￿rm to monitor
him.
We do not model wage determination but assume that the wage is an increasing
function of the probability that the worker is good. We also assume that the worker
and ￿rm separate whenever the probability that the worker is good falls below its
initial value, consistent with an interpretation of worker quality as match-speci￿c.
Under these assumptions, provided they do not separate, a worker who is initially
placed in the low no-monitoring range receives continuous (automatic) wage increases
until the probability that he is good rises su¢ ciently so that the ￿rm monitors him.
At this point, he reaches the ￿top of the scale￿for his ￿job￿and does not receive a
wage increase until he is promoted.
While the base model ￿ts some regularities reported in the literature on internal
labor markets, it is inconsistent with some results regarding promotion patterns.
Allowing for partial monitoring and for false positives (apparent crises that can be
solved by all workers) addresses many of these inconsistencies and provides a basis
for exploring the sources of variation in internal labor markets.
The next section brie￿ y discusses some of the underpinnings of the model. It is
followed by an intuitive presentation of the argument. The formal model is described
and its implications for monitoring are analyzed in section three. In section four we
develop the implications for internal labor markets and discuss their relation to the
empirical regularities. Section ￿ve presents some extensions. The last section has
concluding remarks.
1 Internal Labor Markets, Monitoring and Crises
In the last two decades the Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a&b), hereafter
BGH, analysis of the career patterns of managerial workers within a single service
sector ￿rm has justi￿ably received a great deal of attention. In particular, Gibbons
and Waldman (1999a, 2006, see also 1999b) develop a simple and elegant model
designed to address many of the features of the internal labor market described in
BGH (1994b). To some extent, we, too, will seek to explain some of the regularities
2in the internal labor market studied by BGH, but we also emphasize that the features
of that internal labor market are by no means universal.
1.1 Nonmanagerial Internal Labor Markets
There is a great deal of wage-setting at the individual level among the managerial
employees in the ￿rm studied by BGH. It is di¢ cult to get precise information on
how common it is for ￿rms to set pay at the individual level. We provide some
evidence from the UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).
The WERS asks managers to list the determinants of pay in the largest nonman-
agerial occupation in their establishment. Occupations are de￿ned in very broad
categories (e.g. skilled workers, administrative and secretarial, technical). Because
collective bargaining agreements may require ￿rms to set wage di⁄erentials on the ba-
sis of objective measures, we limit our analysis to ￿rms with no workers whose wages
are set by collective bargaining. Among these nonunion establishments, roughly 20
percent report no variation in pay within their largest class of nonmanagerial workers
except for hours, overtime and shift di⁄erentials, and another 3 percent report using
only these factors and some form of objective pay for performance such as piece rates
or commission.1 Of the remaining establishments, a further 14 percent di⁄erentiate
pay on the basis of skills/core competencies and/or job grade but not factors such
as seniority or performance evaluations. Since the occupations considered are quite
broad, such di⁄erences may re￿ ect only di⁄erences between jobs (e.g. carpenter and
electrician). We restrict the remainder of the analysis to establishments that clearly
have some form of individualized pay that is not strictly piece-rate or similar.
Of those for whom there is clear di⁄erentiation in pay within similar jobs, 63
percent determine pay at least in part by age, experience, seniority and/or formal
quali￿cations such as education but not on the basis of subjective performance mea-
sures. In contrast, only 5 percent use subjective performance evaluations but not the
objective factors in the previous sentence and 32 percent use both. These numbers
should be treated with considerable caution. Of managers who reported that per-
1All calculations use the establishment weights.
3formance appraisal or assessment was one of the factors that explain the di⁄erences
in the level of pay of full-time workers in the largest occupation in their establish-
ment, only about one-quarter also reported that merit pay, de￿ned as pay related to
a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager, was
used anywhere in the establishment.
In sum, it is unclear just how prevalent individualized pay based on individual
performance is, at least at the nonmanagerial level. It is, however, very clear that
much of pay is determined by objective factors that may be correlates of productivity
but are certainly not measures of productivity. Almost half of establishments that
have di⁄erentiated pay do so on the basis of seniority within the ￿rm and about
three-quarters do so on the basis of either seniority or experience.
One of the tasks before us is therefore to explain why ￿rms might rely on such
factors, particularly seniority, rather than on either actual productivity or subjective
performance measures.
1.2 Monitoring
Payment on the basis of either measured output or subjective performance re-
quires some form of monitoring. Surprisingly, the literature on monitoring in the
labor market almost universally assumes that its sole purpose is to allow ￿rms to
punish workers who shirk, cheat or steal. Yet, this assumption both generates em-
pirical predictions that are, at the least, problematic and is inconsistent with our
everyday experience.
From a theoretical perspective, modeling monitoring as designed to enforce good
behavior is problematic. The standard result from the literature on crime is that
since detection is costly and deterrence depends on the probability of detection mul-
tiplied by the cost of punishment, ￿nes should be as large as possible and monitoring
should be minimal. Dickens, Katz, Lang and Summers (1989) refer to this as the
monitoring puzzle. Akerlof and Katz show that the only solution to models of this
sort is the one derived by Becker and Stigler (1974), which is to have workers ￿buy￿
their jobs and to have the purchase price returned to them when they retire. If
4workers￿ability to purchase their job is limited, ￿rms may require them to engage in
rent dissipating behavior (Murphy and Topel, 1990). Neither purchase of jobs nor
obviously rent-dissipating requirements are a common feature of job contracts.2 If
bonding is costless, more general earnings pro￿les are possible, but the logic of the
argument requires that wages be less than value of marginal product early in senior-
ity and more than VMP later (Lazear, 1979, 1981). The e¢ cient contract sets hours
so that VMP equals the worker￿ s marginal value of leisure, while workers would wish
to choose to set the marginal value of leisure equal to their wage. This implies that
junior workers will want to work less than required by the optimal contract while
senior workers will want to work more. In fact, the desire to work less increases with
seniority (Kahn and Lang, 1992, 1995).
Moreover, the view that monitoring serves primarily as a discipline device violates
everyday experience. We do not check our research assistant￿ s work mainly to deter
him from shirking, nor do we ￿re him if we catch an error. We want to avoid the cost
of a mistake. The frequency with which we ￿nd errors will a⁄ect our assessment of the
research assistant and thus our decision to rehire him. But in this sense monitoring is
part of our process of evaluating the research assistant. The threat that we may ￿re
or not rehire the assistant may have the additional e⁄ect of encouraging the assistant
to work harder in order to reduce the frequency of errors, but our monitoring decision
is mostly a⁄ected by our need to catch errors and to know whether the assistant is
competent. As we become more convinced that the assistant can handle the tasks to
which he has been assigned, we are likely to reduce our monitoring. In this respect we
resemble private sector managers who often monitor workers as part of an evaluation
process and review work to determine that it has been done correctly.
In this paper, we focus on monitoring for the purpose of evaluation although
in the extensions section, we address monitoring to catch errors. Formal modeling
of monitoring solely for the purpose of catching and correcting mistakes provides us
2One solution to solving the concern that moral hazard models predict bonds that are, in fact,
rarely observed in the market is to combine moral hazard with adverse selection as in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1988). That paper shows how a hierarchy with discrete levels can arise when ￿rms
face both problems. We abstract from adverse selection problems by assuming that workers and
￿rms have symmetric information.
5with few nontrivial insights, while combining the possibility of productive monitoring
with evaluative monitoring changes the mathematics but not the essential message.
Our model is closest in spirit to Lazear (1986) and Bjerk (2008) who assumes
that ￿rms learn less about worker productivity in low-level jobs where productivity
is less responsive to ability. However, in that model, presumably because ￿rms cannot
capture rents from their knowledge of worker productivity and they cannot commit to
a job assignment, variation in learning is an exogenous response to a job assignment
decision made on the basis of where the worker￿ s expected productivity is highest.
Lazear relates the cost of monitoring to the choice of payment mechanism and, in
particular, to whether performance in a particular period a⁄ects compensation.
1.3 Crises
The way we model monitoring re￿ ects our view that the issue is the ability to do
the di¢ cult parts of a job. In many, perhaps most, jobs much of the work is routine
for any trained worker. We do not wish to imply that there are no specialized skills.
Many of us do not know how to change the oil in a car, but for anyone trained as
a mechanic, this is usually straightforward. Physicians frequently see and recognize
the same cluster of symptoms, making certain diagnoses straightforward for anyone
who has been properly trained. Most real estate transactions are su¢ ciently simple
that in some U.S. states, no lawyer need be involved.
However, sometimes something nonroutine arises: the drain plug will not loosen;
the symptoms do not quite fall into the usual cluster; previous sale of the property
was mishandled. If the individual faced with the nonroutine task is skilled, she may
be the only one who is ever aware of it: she ￿nds an appropriate torque wrench
and loosens the plug without stripping it; he diagnoses the condition accurately and
prescribes the proper treatment; she contacts the lawyer who handled the previous
sale and has the problem corrected. However, if the worker is unskilled at his job,
the outcome may be very noticeable: he strips the plug; oil leaks out and the engine
is seriously damaged; she produces a diagnosis of asthma when the problem is heart
disease; the patient soon dies of a heart attack; the legal error from the last sale
6goes unnoticed; the new owner later incurs considerable expense to establish rightful
ownership. The famous con-artist, Frank Abagnale, claims to have worked for eleven
months as chief resident pediatrician in a Georgia hospital until he was faced with
an oxygen-deprived baby and was almost exposed (Abagnale, 1980).
2 Intuition
It is very costly to assign a worker to a job for which he does not have the requisite
skills. Only when the ￿rm has reasonable con￿dence about the worker￿ s ability to
respond to crises will the worker be assigned to high-level jobs where crises can be
costly. But it is also valuable to make full use of skilled workers who are capable of
responding to crises, rather than to assign them to low-level jobs where their skill
is less valuable. Therefore the ￿rm wants to learn whether or not its workers are
skilled.
Failure to solve a crisis is usually very noticeable. So one option for the ￿rm is
simply to wait. As time passes, it becomes less and less likely that the worker has
never been faced with a crisis, and if the ￿rm has not observed a crisis, more and
more likely that the worker addressed one or more crises successfully.
Alternatively, the ￿rm can monitor the worker to determine if a crisis is occurring.
In this case, it knows whether or not there has been a crisis rather than simply
inferring the likelihood of the crisis from the length of time the worker has been at
risk of facing a crisis. In either case, the ￿rm will know if the worker has failed to
solve a crisis. The advantage of monitoring is that if the worker solves a crisis, the
￿rm learns this immediately, and because it now knows that the worker can handle
crises, can move him instantly to a job where his skill is more valuable.
When should the ￿rm monitor the worker, and when should it simply wait? If
the ￿rm￿ s prior that the worker is good is very low, then monitoring has very little
bene￿t; the probability that the ￿rm will observe a crisis and discover that the worker
is actually good is, by de￿nition, very low. Therefore the expected bene￿t is low and
monitoring is unlikely to be pro￿table.
Consider now the case of an unmonitored worker who is just about to be promoted
7assuming that she does not fail to solve a crisis during the very brief period before
promotion. By de￿nition, ex ante the ￿rm expects to make (almost) the same pro￿t
whether it places her in the high or low job. Thus, if the ￿rm monitors the worker,
it gives up an expected zero ￿ ow-bene￿t but pays the ￿ ow cost of monitoring until
a crisis arrives and thus has a ￿nite expected cost.
So the ￿rm will not monitor workers who are either very unlikely to be good
or who are su¢ ciently likely to be good that they, with high probability, will be
promoted shortly anyway. If any workers are monitored, it will be those with an
intermediate probability of being good.
We make this argument formally in the next section.
3 The Formal Model
3.1 Workers and jobs
An employer hires a worker whom he can put in a high task (H) or a low task
(L). The worker￿ s productivity in a given task depends on his type, which may be
good (G) or bad (B). Both types of worker produce a ￿ ow output normalized to
zero per unit time in the low task and g > 0 per unit time in the high task. ￿0 will
be the ￿rm￿ s prior belief that the worker is good. For the moment it is irrelevant
whether type is general or match-speci￿c, but it may be helpful to think of it as
match-speci￿c. In the next section, when we discuss internal labor markets, we will
treat the value of ￿0 when the worker begins working for the ￿rm as the probability
that the worker is good at a randomly chosen ￿rm so that a worker with an initial
￿0 equal to 0:7, will be good at 70 percent of possible ￿rms at which he may work
and bad at the remaining 30 percent.
Crises occur in both H and L tasks with a Poisson arrival rate ￿. This as-
sumption ensures that task assignment is una⁄ected by its impact on learning about
productivity. Assumptions of this nature are common in the literature on internal
labor markets (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a). It might be more natural to
assume that crises are more common in the high tasks, but it greatly complicates
8the math, with, as far as we can tell, little additional insight.
Bad workers fail when a crisis occurs. Failure generates negative output of ￿cl
in the L-task and ￿ch in the H-task, with ch > cl. If a worker is bad and a crisis
occurs, then the failure is immediately observed and the worker￿ s type is revealed.
Good workers resolve crises when they occur, with no impact on productivity. Thus
if the worker is good, the occurrence of a crisis can be known only if the worker is
actively monitored, in which case the worker￿ s type is revealed. We assume that
g ￿ ￿ch < ￿￿cl < 0 (1)
so that the expected ￿ ow of output net of costs associated with crises is more negative
when a bad worker is placed in the H-task than when he is placed in the L-task.
Time is continuous and the future is discounted at a rate r.
Under complete information, it is clear that good workers will be put in the H-task
and bad workers will leave the ￿rm since their productivity is negative. We assume
that if a worker is revealed to be bad, she separates from the ￿rm immediately. This
assumption is natural if type is match-speci￿c. Whether the assumption makes sense
if type is general will depend on how the labor market is structured.
3.2 Monitoring
The employer can use one of two strategies to assess workers: monitor (M) or
not-monitor (N). Under strategy N he assigns the worker to a task and does not
monitor him. Thus he only gets con￿rmation of the worker￿ s type if the worker is
bad and a crisis occurs, in which case the worker fails. If the worker is good, or until
a crisis arrives, the employer observes nothing, and can update his beliefs about the
worker as time passes.
Under strategy M, the employer monitors the worker until a crisis occurs, at
which time he learns the worker￿ s type. There is a ￿ ow cost of b per unit time of
monitoring, and the cost must be borne until a crisis occurs. Note that under the
monitoring strategy the employer￿ s beliefs remain unchanged until a crisis occurs, at
which time the employer knows the worker￿ s type. Therefore, if it was optimal to
9monitor the worker, it will continue to be optimal until the ￿rm observes a crisis.
3.3 Optimal promotion without monitoring
First consider a worker who is not monitored by the ￿rm. If ￿0 is not too high,
the employer will place the worker in the L-task. If the worker fails at some time, his
type is revealed to be bad, and he will leave the ￿rm. If he has not failed until time
t, the employer updates his belief about the worker￿ s type to ￿(t;￿0). As time passes
and ￿(t;￿0) becomes su¢ ciently high, the employer may promote the worker to the
H-task. Similarly, a worker who comes in with a su¢ ciently high prior at time 0 will
be placed immediately in the H-task.
Given Poisson arrival, the density function for the arrival of the ￿rst crisis is
￿e￿￿t, hence the probability that the ￿rst crisis arrives by time ￿ is p(￿) = 1￿e￿￿￿.
Thus the probability that a bad worker does not fail by time ￿ is 1 ￿ p(￿) = e￿￿￿.
Theorem 3.1. If the ￿rm does not monitor the worker, then it promotes the worker

























for ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿: (3)
If ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿, the ￿rm places the worker in the H task immediately.
(All proofs are in the appendix.)
Note that (2) has a natural interpretation. The worker is promoted when the
expected ￿ ow payo⁄s in the L and H tasks are equal, that is
￿(1 ￿ ￿
￿)￿cl = g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
￿)￿ch: (4)
10This follows from the assumption that learning about productivity is independent
of task assignment. Therefore the assignment decision is determined solely by the
e⁄ect on expected output. It is plausible that the arrival rate of crises would be
faster in the H-task. In this case, workers would be promoted earlier than implied
by equation (2). However, we have not obtained any additional insights from allowing
for di⁄erent rates of arrival of crises and therefore have not pursued this path.
3.4 Payo⁄ with the monitoring strategy
When the employer monitors the worker he knows when the ￿rst crisis occurs,
and immediately identi￿es the worker￿ s type. Before the arrival of the ￿rst crisis no
new information is generated, so there is no continuous updating of beliefs.
Let ￿0 be the prior that the worker is good. When the ￿rst crisis arrives, with
probability ￿0 the (good) worker resolves the crisis and is promoted to the H-task,
with the complementary probability he fails and leaves the ￿rm. In either case the
employer ceases to monitor him. Recall that monitoring has a ￿ ow cost of b per unit
time. We prove in the appendix that















If not, even if the ￿rm knew that the worker was good and even if the only way it
could assign the worker to the H-task was by monitoring and observing him solve a
crisis, it would prefer not to do so.
3.5 Optimal monitoring
Next we compare the two strategies to determine which one yields the greater
expected payo⁄.
11Theorem 3.3. There is always a range [0;￿a) and a range (￿b;￿
￿] in which it is
e¢ cient not to monitor the worker.
Theorem 3.3 establishes that workers who are very unlikely to be good and work-
ers who are close to promotion will not be monitored, but it does not establish that
￿rms will ever monitor workers in order to determine their quality.
Under what circumstances will the ￿rm engage in monitoring? The following
theorem addresses this question.
Theorem 3.4. There is a range in which monitoring is preferred to no-monitoring
if
￿





￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g
b
: (7)
Condition (7) is not particularly informative. We can derive somewhat more
informative conditions. By conditions (1) and (6), both sides of the inequality are
positive.
As rb ! g￿, the left-hand side goes to in￿nity while the right-hand side remains
￿nite. Thus when monitoring costs are high, not surprisingly the ￿rms never ￿nds it
e¢ cient to monitor. On the other hand, when monitoring costs are su¢ ciently low,
there is a range in which monitoring is e¢ cient.
The gain from monitoring is that the ￿rm is assured that it never places a bad
worker in the H-task. The cost of doing so is given by ￿(ch ￿ cl). Again not surpris-
ingly, as this term gets large, there is always a range in which monitoring is e¢ cient.
When it gets small, or equivalently when the bene￿t from placing a good worker in
the H-task gets small, monitoring is never e¢ cient.
An increase in the frequency of crises, ￿, lowers the left-hand-side and increases
the right-hand side of inequality (7). Thus more frequent arrival of crises is associated
with a larger range of other parameters consistent with monitoring. Conversely, a
higher rate of time discounting is in many ways similar to a lower rate of arrival of
crises and thus is associated with a more restricted set of parameters consistent with
some monitoring.
The relation among ￿; task assignment and monitoring is summarized in ￿gure
1.
12Figure 1: Monitoring and Task Assignment
3.6 Example
Suppose that r = :05; g = 1; ￿ = :2; and ch ￿ cl = 10, which implies that
workers are promoted to the high task when there is a 50% probability that they are
good. Then provided b is less than about :24; there will be a range in which there
is monitoring. When b = :2; the ￿rm does not monitor any worker for whom its
estimate of ￿ is less than about .13, monitors those for whom its estimate of ￿ falls
between about .13 and .35 and does not monitor those above this range.
Figure 2 shows, for two di⁄erent values of ￿, the region in ￿ ￿ b space in which
monitoring is the optimal strategy. The assumed values for the other variables are
r = :05; g = 1;, ch = 10 and cl = 0.
4 Internal Labor Markets and Wage Pro￿les
To address the implications of the model for internal labor markets and wage
pro￿les, we must model turnover and wage determination.
Turnover: Our model of turnover is simple. We interpret e ￿0, the value of ￿
when the worker ￿rst arrives at the ￿rm, as the ex ante probability that the worker
will be good at a randomly selected job (possibly from within a class of jobs). Any
information about the ability of the worker to resolve crises is speci￿c to the particular
functions undertaken in the present ￿rm. Therefore if the updated assessment falls to
￿ < e ￿0; it is e¢ cient for the worker and ￿rm to separate, and they do so. Otherwise
it is e¢ cient for the worker and ￿rm to continue their relationship, and there is no
separation. Thus in the version of the model developed so far, the worker remains
with the ￿rm unless he fails to resolve a crisis in which case the worker quits or is
13Figure 2: Ranges in which Monitoring is Optimal
￿red. Note that we do not really require that success or failure at the current ￿rm
provide no information about productivity elsewhere, only that it is more informative
about productivity at this ￿rm.
Wages: We do not fully model wage determination. The precise wage will depend
on the institutional and informational assumptions we make. However, we assume
that the wage is an increasing function of ￿. We ￿nd this assumption plausible but
recognize that it is not trivial. For example, in our baseline model, Nash bargaining
would generate a reduction in the wage as workers move from the no-monitoring
regime to the monitoring regime.
There are at least two reasons for maintaining the assumption that the wage
is increasing in ￿: The ￿rst is behavioral. Workers show a strong preference for
upward-sloping wage pro￿les even when a ￿ at pro￿le would have a higher present
value (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991). It is hardly plausible that they would
14respond well to being told, ￿Congratulations! Our opinion of you has improved.
Therefore we are cutting your pay.￿For reasons that are not well understood, within
￿rms, nominal wage cuts are rare (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994a). Dohmen
(2004) reports that workers wages are not cut even when they are demoted. A
nontrivial minority even received cost-of-living increases.
The second reason is that monitoring is non-contractible. Therefore workers
may be unwilling to accept lower wages in return for being monitored. In this
case, monitoring would not be chosen e¢ ciently as assumed above, but the broad
characteristics of the model would not change.
We note also that since wages are adjusted discretely, implicit declines in wages
due to the onset of monitoring might not be detectable in the data.
The Internal Wage Pro￿le: Recall that there are four ranges in the data. For ￿ < ￿a;
the worker is assigned to the L-task and is not monitored. For ￿a < ￿ < ￿b; the worker
is assigned to the L-task and monitored. For ￿b < ￿ < ￿
￿; the worker is assigned
to the L-task and not monitored. For ￿ > ￿
￿; the worker is assigned to the H-task
and not monitored. The wage pro￿le for workers who remain with the ￿rm therefore
depends on e ￿0; the value of ￿ when the worker is hired:
1. Workers with a low e ￿0 will be placed into the low no-monitoring range. If
they remain with the ￿rm, the ￿rm gradually increases its assessment of ￿; and
therefore the wage, until ￿ = ￿a: At this point, the ￿rm begins monitoring the
worker, and there is no updating of ￿ until a crisis comes along. Wages remain
￿xed until the worker either leaves the ￿rm or is promoted to the high task.
2. Workers with a somewhat higher initial ￿ will be placed immediately into the
monitoring range. Although their wage will generally be higher than w(￿a)
since most will have e ￿0 > ￿a; in other respects they are similar to workers who
started at a lower e ￿0 and rose to ￿ = ￿a:
3. Workers with a yet higher ￿b ￿ e ￿0 < ￿
￿ remain in the L-task and receive
continuous wage increases until ￿ = ￿
￿, at which point they are promoted to
the H-task and continue to receive wage increases that are asymptotic to the
wage associated with ￿ = 1:
4. Finally, any worker hired with a high initial ￿ is placed directly into the H-
15Figure 3: Seniority, Assessed Ability and Task Assignment
task and receives continuous wage increases in a manner analogous to those
promoted from the upper no-monitoring range.
The relation between ￿ and seniority (t) at two di⁄erent entry values of ￿ is
summarized in ￿gure 3. The lower line represents workers entering with low values
of ￿: The upper line represents those entering with relatively high values of ￿ but not
su¢ ciently high to be placed in the H-task immediately.
The Hierarchical Structure: Heretofore we have referred to tasks rather than to
jobs. Yet in many organizations, collections of tasks that appear quite similar have
di⁄erent job titles (secretary I and II, tenured associate and full professor). In the
empirical literature, hierarchies are sometimes determined by transition patterns
across occupational titles as in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a). In our model,
it is natural to de￿ne three occupation titles: LT1, consisting of workers in the
low no-monitoring and monitoring zones, LT2, consisting of the high no-monitoring
zone, and HT. Although LT2 is higher paid than LT1, neither feeds into the other.
Instead both feed into HT. So LT1 and LT2 appear to share a location at the
16bottom of the hierarchy below HT.
5 Extensions
The biggest empirical weakness of the base model is it predicts counterfactually
that promotions are concentrated at the top of the scale of each of the lower level
jobs in the hierarchy. Yet, the evidence strongly suggests that promotions come
from most parts of the wage distribution within a level of the hierarchy. The strong
(and false) prediction is a direct consequence of assuming that monitoring is either
complete or nonexistent. Moreover, all promotions end up at either the bottom of
the upper level of the hierarchy or at its top. This re￿ ects the assumption that when
monitoring occurs, it is fully informative.3
In the remainder of the paper we relax these two assumptions. We ￿rst consider
the case where di⁄erent monitoring intensities are possible. We then explore the
consequences of allowing false negatives and false positives.
5.1 Partial Monitoring
We maintain the other assumptions of the model but assume that the ￿rm can
vary the e⁄ort with which it monitors the worker. The ￿rm can choose the e⁄ort
and the corresponding ￿ ow cost b of monitoring. If the worker resolves a crisis, the
￿rm observes the success with probability p = p(b). We write the inverse function
b = b(p) and assume that b0 ￿ 0 and b00 ￿ 0.
In the appendix we derive a result (Theorem A.1) that parallels Theorem (3.3),
which is restated below:
3We draw on a growing literature, which we do not attempt to summarize, that examines the
internal labor markets of individual ￿rms. See Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a&b), Dohmen
(2004), Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004), Flabbi and Ichino (2001), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004),
Grund (2005), Kwon (2006), Medo⁄ and Abraham (1980, 1981) and Treble et al (2001). Not all of
the results are found in each of these papers, but we have tried to be careful not to include results
with contradictory evidence.
17Theorem 5.1. If b0(0) > 0 and b00 (p) > 0 8p 2 [0;1], there is always a range [0;￿a)
and a range (￿b;￿
￿] in which it is e¢ cient not to monitor the worker.
Needless to say, if b0 (0) is su¢ ciently small, there will also be a range in which in
which the ￿rm does at least some monitoring, and if b0(1) is su¢ ciently small, there
will also be a range with complete monitoring. Depending on the shape of the b(p)
function, the solution can be bang-bang as in our base model.
The more interesting case is when monitoring increases smoothly between ￿a and
some ￿A at which p equals 1 (full monitoring). It remains at 1 for [￿A;￿B] and then
decreases smoothly between ￿B and ￿b: Then if workers are hired with e ￿0 < ￿a; as in
the baseline case, they will not be monitored, but, unless the worker fails to resolve a
crisis, the ￿rm￿ s assessment of ￿ will rise continuously until it reaches ￿a: Thereafter
the ￿rm continues to update ￿: If no crisis is observed, ￿ rises towards ￿A:4
But the ￿rm may observe the worker resolving a crisis, in which case she is
immediately promoted. In the region between ￿a and ￿A; the probability of promotion
is strictly increasing in ￿ since both the probability of being good and the probability
of being observed solving a crisis both rise with ￿:
If the worker is hired with ￿a < e ￿0 < ￿A; the situation is similar except that she
never experiences the no monitoring regime.
If the worker is hired with ￿A < e ￿0 < ￿B; the ￿rm does not update ￿ except
simultaneously with a separation or promotion.
If ￿B < e ￿0 < ￿b, the ￿rm continuously updates ￿ and gradually reduces moni-
toring. It is clear that for ￿ close to ￿b; the probability of promotion must be lower
than for ￿ close to ￿B; but we have not been able to establish whether the relation
between the probability of promotion and ￿ is monotonic in this range and expect
that it need not be. Finally we note that if ￿b < e ￿0 < ￿
￿; the worker is not monitored.
In the absence of a failed crisis, ￿ is updated continuously until it reaches ￿
￿ and the
worker is promoted to the high job.
As in the base model, there are no promotions from the L-task to the H-task
originating at ￿ < ￿a or ￿b < ￿ < ￿
￿, and all promotions are from one task to
4It appears to us that ￿ will reach ￿A only asymptotically, but we have not proved this.
18the other: Thus, we continue to have two separate ￿jobs￿at the lower level of the
hierarchy leading to the upper level.
5.2 False negatives
Because only bad workers fail to resolve crises in the base model, failures always
cause separations. Workers never remain with the ￿rm after a negative shock to
￿. Therefore, there are never real wage decreases except possibly for the e⁄ects of
macroeconomic shocks outside the model.
In this section, we show that if we allow good workers to solve crises only with
some probability, ￿ < 1; then there is an initial probationary period during which
any failure causes a separation. After the probationary period, the ￿rm may respond
to a failure by reducing its assessment of ￿ depending on the worker￿ s history.
To analyze this case, we return to the assumption that monitoring is a binary
decision. We maintain the assumption that the ￿rm and worker separate whenever
￿ falls below e ￿0; the value of ￿ when the worker joined the ￿rm.
Theorem 5.2. A su¢ cient condition for a failure to result in a separation is that






It should be noted that condition (8) is only relevant for workers who spent their
￿probationary period￿in the no-monitoring range. Intuitively, during this period,
the ￿rm￿ s beliefs about ￿ improve su¢ ciently that the failure is not su¢ cient to
lower this assessment below its initial level. However, if the worker did not spend
the requisite time in the no-monitoring range, then the ￿rm￿ s assessment of ￿ will
not have risen su¢ ciently to o⁄set the reduction resulting from failure, except in the
special case of a worker who was monitored and observed to solve a crisis.
Note also that the probation period will always result in a substantial fraction of






The left-hand side of (9) is the probability that the worker will have faced a crisis
before time t. The right-hand side is always greater than .5. So if good workers
are very bad at solving crises, ￿fty percent of workers must have failed (and been
￿red) before workers reach the point that a failure does not cause separation. If good
workers can solve half of the crises they face, then two-thirds of workers will have
faced a crisis before reaching the level of seniority at which a failure does not lead
to separation. Of these, all the bad workers and half the good workers would have
been ￿red for failing to solve the crisis. And, of course, if good workers always solve
crises, the ￿probationary period￿lasts forever.
Finally, we should emphasize that surviving the probationary period does not
mean having tenure, only that the ￿rst failure does not induce a separation. Multiple
failures may still result in a separation.
Without speci￿c assumptions about parameter values, it is impossible to deter-
mine what fraction of workers will ever experience a reduction in ￿: It seems to us
that in many settings the proportion is likely to be modest but consistent with the
description ￿not rare,￿but others may have di⁄erent priors about ￿; ￿, the distrib-
ution of e ￿0 and the distribution of the other fundamental parameters of the model.
What the model does predict strongly is that real wage reductions not associated
with macroeconomic phenomena will be rare early in a worker￿ s tenure with the ￿rm.
We are not aware of any results on this point.
5.3 False positives
The assumption that only good workers solve crises produces the strong and em-
pirically false result that monitored workers who resolve crises are always promoted
to the top of the next level of the hierarchy. In this sub-section we consider what
happens if monitoring can produce false positives, that is the worker can appear to
20have resolved a crisis when none existed. Let ￿ be the arrival rate of false positives
and let ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿) be the proportion of apparent crises that are not really crises.
Then if the ￿rm observes that a worker with ￿ = ￿0 has ￿resolved a crisis,￿the ￿rm￿ s
assessment of ￿ will be updated to
￿ =
￿0
(1 ￿ ￿)￿0 + ￿
: (10)
It is both intuitive and straightforward to show that if, when ￿ is 0; there is an
interval of ￿0 for which the ￿rm monitors the worker, then for ￿ su¢ ciently small,
there is still an interval for which the ￿rm monitors the worker and, if the worker
appears to resolve a crisis is promoted to the H-task although the updated ￿ is less
than one:
False positives leading to promotion to the H job We begin by assuming
that false positives are su¢ ciently rare that within the monitoring range, if the ￿rm
believes the worker has solved a crisis, it promotes him to the H job. Having derived
the monitoring range, we will then have to verify that this assumption holds.
Suppose that after observing a ￿resolved crisis￿￿ > ￿
￿ and normalize the starting
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Suppose next that the next apparent crisis occurs at time t, then the value of the
monitoring strategy is
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gives the value of the monitoring strategy.
Substituting for ￿; U(￿) and ￿
U (￿0) =
(￿ + ￿)￿0g
r(￿ + ￿ + r)
￿
b
(￿ + ￿ + r)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿0)￿cl
(￿ + ￿ + r)
+
￿ (g ￿ ￿ch)(1 ￿ ￿0)
(￿ + r)(￿ + ￿ + r)
: (18)
When ￿ = 0; this reduces to the earlier expression.
The existence of false positives does not a⁄ect the value of the waiting strategy.
Therefore, it will be optimal to monitor if
(￿ + ￿)￿0g
r(￿ + ￿ + r)
￿
b
(￿ + ￿ + r)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿0)￿cl
(￿ + ￿ + r)
+
￿ (g ￿ ￿ch)(1 ￿ ￿0)




























As we would expect, the rhs is declining in ￿. Higher arrival rates of false positives
shrink the range of ￿0 for which monitoring is optimal. The rest goes through. The
rhs is zero at ￿0 = ￿
￿ and negative at ￿ = 0 although this last result is misleading
because ￿ = 0 is inconsistent with switching to the high task after a positive result.
If all positives result in promotion to the high task, then we require that the
inequality be reversed at the lowest ￿0 leading to promotion to the H job. This






















If ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 0, then despite false positives, all monitored workers who
appear to resolve a crisis will be promoted to the high job. Note that for ￿ close to
0, the conditions under which monitoring is optimal will be similar to those with no
false positives.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently large, workers at the lower end of the monitoring range who
appear to have solved a crisis may be promoted to the upper no-monitoring zone
in the L-task. However, we can show that except in a knife-edge case, successful
workers at the top end of the monitoring range will be promoted to the H-task.
It seems likely that, for ￿ su¢ ciently large and b su¢ ciently small, the updating
of ￿ could leave the worker in the monitoring range. Since as b goes to zero, the
entire range of ￿ < ￿
￿ is monitored and since as ￿ gets large the updated value of ￿
remains close to the value prior to the apparent crisis, it seems that this possibility
must exist, but we have not explored it.
Finally, we have not explored formally the case in which crises are di⁄erentially
informative. In this subsection we have assumed that crises are either real or false.
Plausibly, crises di⁄er in the likelihood that a bad worker can resolve them. Thus
some crises would be more informative than others about worker ability. Solving a
more informative crisis leads to a larger upward revision of ￿:
Example In the example below, we set the value of output in the H-task to 1, the
arrival rate of crises to 1 and the cost of a failed crisis to be 2:1 higher in the H-task
than in the L-task. The arrival rate of false positives is also 1; the discount rate is
:1 and the ￿ ow cost of monitoring is :125. The results are the following:
1. For ￿ less than about :34, the worker is not monitored. If he is not observed
23to have failed to resolve the crisis, the assessment of ￿ is continually increased
until it reaches :34
2. For ￿ between roughly :34 and :355; the worker is monitored. If he appears
to resolve a crisis he is promoted to the no-monitoring region; otherwise the
assessment of ￿ is unchanged.
3. For ￿ between roughly :355 and :43; the worker is monitored. If he appears
to resolve a crisis is promoted to the H-task; otherwise the assessment of ￿ is
unchanged.
4. For ￿ between roughly :43 and :524 the worker is not monitored. If he is not
observed to have failed to resolve a crisis, the assessment of ￿ is continually
increased until it reaches :524 and the worker is assigned to the H-task.
Note that the internal labor market path will depend on the level of ￿ at which
workers are typically hired. If most workers are hired when the probability of the
worker being good is less than one-third, they will begin in the no-monitoring zone
and remain for a while unless they are shown to be bad at the job. Eventually, they
will hit the bottom of the monitoring zone where they will remain until they appear
to face a crisis. After the apparent crisis, they will either be shown to be bad at this
job and separate from it or will be promoted to the higher no-monitoring zone where
they will remain and rise within the zone until they are promoted to the H-task or
separate. Workers who are hired into the monitoring zone may be promoted into the
monitoring zone or the H-task depending on the value of ￿ when they entered.
5.4 Monitoring to Correct Mistakes
So far we have assumed that the sole purpose of monitoring workers is to learn
about their type. Monitoring the worker may also permit the ￿rm to mitigate or
eliminate the cost of any mistakes.5
Allowing monitoring to eliminate costly mistakes in the L-task has no important
implications provided that b > ￿cl so that it is not e¢ cient to monitor simply to
5Garicano (2000) analyzes a model in which workers who cannot solve a problem, pass it up the
hierarchy. In our setting, workers need not even be aware that they are facing a problem they cannot
solve before the damage is realized and therefore do not have the opportunity to seek assistance.
24catch mistakes even if the worker is known to be bad. The proof that there cannot be
monitoring when ￿ is close to 0 and when ￿ is close to but less than ￿
￿ goes through
mutatis mutandum. Of course, by o⁄setting some of the cost of monitoring, the
ability to correct mistakes will increase the range of parameters for which monitoring
is optimal.
Monitoring to catch mistakes in the H-task is somewhat more interesting. We
limit ourselves to a few remarks and do not analyze this case fully. We note that if
monitoring fully eliminates mistakes, then a monitored worker has net output ￿bl in
the L-task and g ￿ bh in the H-task. In this case, monitoring will be used at most
in one task. The case where monitoring is only used in the L-task was discussed in
the previous paragraph. Suppose monitoring occurs only in the H-task, and that
b > g +￿cl. Then for low values of ￿, workers are assigned to the L-task and are not
monitored. When ￿ becomes su¢ ciently high, the worker is assigned to the H-task
and monitored until a crisis arises.6 Workers with su¢ ciently high ￿ are assigned to
the H-task and never monitored.
If monitoring in the H-task lowers but does not eliminate the cost of unresolved
crises or, equivalently, eliminates the cost some, but not all, of the time, monitoring
in the H-task is e¢ cient if
bh < (1 ￿ ￿)￿(ch ￿ cm) (22)
where cm is the cost of an unresolved crisis when the worker is monitored in the
H-task. If ch ￿ cm is su¢ ciently large relative to bh, there will be a range of ￿ for
which, if workers are assigned to the H-task, they will be monitored.
The theorem below addresses the case where bh = b and monitoring does not
a⁄ect the cost of unresolved crises in the L-task: The assumption about g ensures
that a ￿rm that monitored all workers regardless of ￿ would assign workers with low
values of ￿ to the L-task and assign those with high values of ￿ to the H-task.
6For ￿ = 0; it is e¢ cient to assign the worker to the L-task and not monitor him. The existence
of a no-monitoring range follows by continuity. In the H-task, the value of monitoring arises solely
from the ability to catch mistakes. Therefore, if monitoring occurs in the H-task, it will always be
for the lowest values of ￿ associated with that task.
25Theorem 5.3. If b > 0, g ￿ ￿cm < ￿￿cl, and b/(￿(ch ￿ cm)) is su¢ ciently small,
there is always a range [0;￿a) and a range (￿b;￿
￿] in which it is e¢ cient not to
monitor the worker and assign him to the L-task and a range (￿
￿;￿c) in which it is
e¢ cient to monitor the worker and assign him to the H-task.
We do not explore formally the conditions under which a monitoring range in
the L-task exists. For su¢ ciently low b, monitoring will be desirable. We have
established that whether monitoring and assignment to the L-task is more pro￿table
than monitoring and assignment to the H-task depends on ￿ but not on b. Therefore
for su¢ ciently low b; there will be values of ￿ for which workers will be monitored in
the L-task.
Thus it is possible to have monitoring at both the intermediate range of the L-
task and the bottom of the H-task, albeit with di⁄erent goals. Perhaps strikingly,
workers will never be promoted to an unmonitored range of the H-task unless they
are known to be good (￿ = 1) although workers may be hired into this range.
We note also that only workers who are hired into the upper no-monitoring range
of the L-task will ever be monitored in the H-task. It is therefore unclear whether
workers who are monitored at the bottom of the H-task would be viewed as at the
bottom of a new job scale or at the top of the one into which they were hired. In
the latter case, we again have the phenomenon of workers being hired into a job
classi￿cation receiving regularly scheduled pay increases until they ￿hit the top of
the scale￿and only receiving further pay increases following promotion.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
If we allow for partial monitoring, our model permits the following monitoring







Not all stages need exist. For the no monitoring range to exist, we require that
b0(0) > 0; so that is that it is costly to do even a little monitoring. For partial
monitoring, we require b00 > 0; and for the existence of full monitoring, we require
that b0(1) be su¢ ciently small.
Therefore, the precise nature of the internal labor market depends on the moni-
toring technology. We should not be surprised by variation in internal labor markets
across companies and types of workers.
If monitoring is very expensive, wages are likely to be determined largely by
observable proxies for productivity such as education and seniority. If monitor-
ing is inexpensive and crises are very informative, there is likely to be little wage
growth within job assignment. At intermediate monitoring costs, wages may rise
formulaically within some job assignment until some maximum wage. With partial
monitoring, they climb formulaically except for ￿fast-trackers￿who get a boost from
resolving a crisis.
Our model can be contrasted with that of Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006).
The major di⁄erence is that in our model, learning comes in large chunks and when it
does not come, either there is no learning or updating depends only on the passage of
time. In contrast, in Gibbons and Waldman, ￿rms continuously receive information
about workers which allows them to distinguish among them. We do not view these
approaches as strict alternatives. Clearly, information can come in both forms.
Our approach has both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, as
discussed above, in many jobs wages are determined solely by objective measures such
as tenure and education that are only very imperfectly related to productivity. In
our model, wages are explained perfectly by e ￿0; task assignment and seniority. If we
consider education to be an imperfect proxy for e ￿0; the model is strongly consistent
27with this regularity. However, on the negative side, it is too strong. There are many
settings in which wages are determined in part by subjective performance evaluations
even though much of the variation in wages is explained by education, seniority and
tier in the hierarchy.
Our model is also consistent with both the steady increase in wages (at least up to
some maximum) that often accompanies seniority and the large jumps in wages often
associated with promotions. The strong association between large wage increases and
promotions does not arise naturally in Gibbons/Waldman.
In both models demotions are rare, albeit for di⁄erent reasons. In Gibbons and
Waldman workers acquire human capital over time. The worker will be demoted
only if new information is su¢ ciently negative to outweigh the growth in human
capital and if the worker￿ s productivity previously placed him just above the cuto⁄
between two levels of the hierarchy. In contrast, demotions are rare in our model
because negative information usually causes a separation. In Gibbons/Waldman
demotions should be concentrated among recently promoted workers. In our model,
demotions should be particularly rare among workers with low seniority. We know
of no empirical ￿ndings on these two issues.
In contrast, the Gibbons/Waldman model is better able to explain the frequency
of real wage decreases. In our model, in the absence of macroeconomic shocks, real
wage decreases are like demotions. Bad news is infrequent and generally results in
a separation not in the worker remaining with the ￿rm but with a lower estimate
of ￿: In our model, small real wage decreases happen only when there are negative
macroeconomic shocks.
Finally, we note that technology has made monitoring easier. In almost any
model including this one, this will make pay-for-performance more common. Consis-
tent with this expectation, the proportion of British workers receiving performance
pay rose from 16 to 32 percent of workers between 1988 and 1994 (Manning and
Saidi, 2008). But our model suggests some less obvious e⁄ects. Reducing the cost
of monitoring could shift the nature of the hierarchy. When monitoring is relatively
expensive, as discussed above, we can have two apparent jobs at the low task, one
comprised of workers in or below the full monitoring range and one comprised of
28workers above the full monitoring range, with both jobs leading directly to the high
task and relatively little ￿lateral￿movement. When monitoring becomes less expen-
sive, particularly if it becomes easier to observe less informative crises, there will be
more movement from the lower range of the low task into the upper range of the
low task so that the low task now appears more like a single job in the hierarchy.
Thus we believe the model could be used to help explain how hierarchical structures
change over time.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Suppose a worker with prior ￿0 has been put in a job at time 0 and has not failed
until time t. If the worker is good, then non-failure occurs with probability 1, and if
he is bad then the probability of non-failure is equal to the probability that a crisis
31has not occurred by time t. Thus the employer￿ s updated belief about the worker￿ s
type (i.e., the updated probability that the worker is good) is:
￿(t;￿0) =
￿0
￿0 + [1 ￿ p(t)](1 ￿ ￿0)
(23)
which for future reference we rearrange as




Let ￿ ￿ be the threshold such that a worker who was initially placed in an L-job is
promoted to the H-job when ￿(t) ￿ ￿ ￿ . We will show below that ￿ ￿ is independent of
￿0. De￿ne ￿ t(￿0) such that ￿(￿ t(￿0);￿0) = ￿ ￿. Below we will suppress the arguments in
￿ t(:), ￿(:) etc.
If ￿0 < ￿ ￿, then the employer puts the worker in the L-job, and promotes him if he
has not failed by time ￿ t. Thus a good worker produces nothing between times 0 and
￿ t, and thereafter produces a ￿ ow output of g. A bad worker fails before promotion
with probability p(￿ t). With probability [1 ￿ p(￿ t)] he produces nothing until ￿ t, and
thereafter produces g until the ￿rst crisis arrives, at which time he produces ￿ch and
is ￿red. Hence the expected payo⁄ from the N-strategy with prior ￿0 and threshold
￿ ￿ is































32Note that e￿r￿ t = e[￿￿￿ t] r
￿ = [1 ￿ p(￿ t)]
r
￿, which substituted in (25) yields
U(￿0;[1 ￿ p(￿ t)]) =
1
r






[1 ￿ p(￿ t)]
￿+r
￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)(￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)cl
￿
￿ + r
The employer maximizes this payo⁄ by choosing ￿ ￿, or equivalently ￿ t or p(￿ t).














[1 ￿ p(￿ t)]
r
￿(1 ￿ ￿0)(￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g)
[1 ￿ p(￿ t)]
￿1￿0g = (1 ￿ ￿0)(￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g) (28)
Let (28) be solved at ￿ t = t￿, and correspondingly ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿ etc. Using (24), (28)
simpli￿es to







￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g
￿(ch ￿ cl)
It can be checked that the second derivative of U(￿0;[1￿p(￿ t)]) in (27) is strictly
negative at the solution, as follows:
@2U
@[1 ￿ p(￿ t)]2 =
r ￿ ￿
￿





2(1 ￿ ￿0)[1 ￿ p]
( r














so this is indeed a strict maximum.
33Note also that the optimal threshold ￿
￿ is independent of the prior ￿0, from which
it follows that a worker entering with prior ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿ will be placed directly in the
H-job. At the optimum, the employer￿ s expected payo⁄from a new worker with prior
￿0 ￿ ￿















for ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿ (29)
It follows directly that U￿ is increasing in ￿0. For ￿0 ￿ ￿
￿. It is straightforward to










￿) for ￿0 > ￿
￿
￿
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2




r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)cl
￿
: Expected discount-






























Rearranging terms yields (5).
34A.3 Proof of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4
A.3.1 Preliminaries:
Given a prior ￿, it is better to monitor the worker than not monitor if
















































If ￿ = 0 or ￿ = ￿
￿, Z (￿) = 0; which proves the existence of the lower and upper
no-monitoring ranges.
A.3.3 Theorem 3.4
Monitoring is more pro￿table than no-monitoring at ￿ if Z(￿) ￿ rb. First we
prove that Z is concave. We have
dZ
d￿
































Next we establish conditions under which Z(￿) exceeds rb, that is there is a
35range in which monitoring is preferred to no-monitoring. Z(￿) is a maximum when






￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g
) = [
￿(1 ￿ ￿)




Let ￿ = ^ ￿ solve (33). Note that the right-hand side of (33) is less than unity, which
in turn implies that
^ ￿(
￿(ch ￿ cl)
￿(ch ￿ cl) ￿ g
) < 1
) ^ ￿ <




substituting (33) in (31) gives
Z(^ ￿) = ￿^ ￿g[
r
￿(1 ￿ ^ ￿) + r
]
which in (30) yields




￿(1 ￿ ^ ￿) + r
> b




To prove the theorem, note that the left-hand-side of (33) is increasing in ￿ while
the right-hand-side is decreasing in ￿. Thus (34) will be satis￿ed if and only if the
lhs of (33) is less than the rhs at ￿ =
b(￿+r)
￿(g+b). This condition on rearrangement yields
the theorem.
￿
36A.4 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We prove a somewhat expanded version of the theorem, which follows after some
preliminary constructions and a lemma.
Let p(￿) be the optimal monitoring program, and let U(￿) be the value of the optimal
program starting from ￿.
The strategy of the proof is as follows. We consider a small deviation from p(￿)
that holds monitoring intensity constant at some arbitrary level ^ p for a given time-
interval t starting from some arbitrary ￿0. Letting t ! 0 yields a program the value of
which di⁄ers from U(￿0) by a determinate function of ^ p. This di⁄erence must attain
a minimum of zero at ^ p = p(￿0). We use this to obtain a ￿rst-order characterization
of p(￿0), and by extension of the optimal monitoring program. The theorem then
follows from this characterization.
We assume that p(￿) is right-continuous in ￿. Continue to assume that the worker
is promoted at ￿
￿ =
￿(ch￿cl)￿g
￿(ch￿cl) . Observe that p(￿) = 0 must hold for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. Denote
the ￿ ow cost of monitoring at intensity p by b(p). Assume b0(p) > 0; b00(p) > 0 8p 2
[0;1].
Now consider the following program h￿0; ^ p(￿);ti starting from ￿0 < ￿
￿: monitor-
ing occurs at the constant rate ^ p for time t. After t we revert to the optimal program




￿0e￿￿^ pt + (1 ￿ ￿0)e￿￿t
=
￿0
￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)e￿(1￿^ p)￿t (35)




￿(1 ￿ ^ p)￿0(1 ￿ ￿0)e￿(1￿^ p)￿t
[ ￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿0)e￿(1￿^ p)￿t ]2
Taking limits as t ! 0 and considering arbitrary ￿, this implies
37d￿
dt
= ￿(1 ￿ ^ p)￿(1 ￿ ￿) (36)
which depends only on ￿ and the monitoring intensity at ￿.
For small t, the value of the program h￿0; ^ p(￿);ti is given by
^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) u ￿0 [ ^ p￿tU(1) + (1 ￿ ^ p￿t)U(￿1) ]
+ (1 ￿ ￿0) [ (1 ￿ ￿t)U(￿1) ] ￿ b(^ p)t (37)
Note that the function ^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) di⁄ers from the function U(￿) to the extent that it
incorporates the perturbation implied by h￿0; ^ p(￿);ti. So
^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) ￿ U(￿0) u ￿0^ p￿tU(1) ￿ [ ￿0^ p￿t + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿t ] U(￿1)
+ [U(￿1) ￿ U(￿0)] ￿ b(^ p)t (38)
Dividing both sides by t and taking limits as t ! 0 we get
lim
t!0
^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) ￿ U(￿0)
t





￿ b(^ p) (39)
since ￿1 ! ￿0 as t ! 0. The equivalence in (39) re￿ ects the fact that the approxi-
mation in (37) holds for all values of ^ p. Using (36), (39) reduces to
lim
t!0
^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) ￿ U(￿0)
t
￿ ￿0^ p￿U(1) ￿ [￿0^ p￿ + (1 ￿ ￿0)￿] U(￿0)
+ (1 ￿ ^ p)￿￿0(1 ￿ ￿0) U
0(￿0) ￿ b(^ p) (40)
Since U(￿0) is the value of the optimal monitoring program, ^ U(￿0; ^ p;t)￿U(￿0) ￿ 0
for all ^ p. Now consider ^ p = p(￿0). Since p(￿) is right-continuous ￿1 > ￿0, and
￿1 ! ￿0 as t ! 0, it follows that, for t small enough, p(￿0) is arbitrarily close to
p(￿) 8￿ 2 [￿0;￿1]. Hence ^ U(￿0; ^ p;t) ! U(￿0) as t ! 0. Hence ^ p = p(￿0) maximizes
38the left-hand side of (40), and by virtue of the equivalence must also maximize the
right-hand side. This implies that the derivative of the right hand side with respect
to ^ p must vanish at ^ p = p(￿0) if p(￿0) is interior, or satisfy appropriate conditions
for a corner solution if not.
b
0(pjp=p(￿0)) = ￿￿0[ U(1) ￿ fU(￿0) + (1 ￿ ￿0) U
0(￿0)g ] ; 0 < p(￿0) < 1 (41)
b
0(pjp=p(￿0)) ￿ ￿￿0[ U(1) ￿ fU(￿0) + (1 ￿ ￿0) U
0(￿0)g ] ; p(￿0) = 0
b
0(pjp=p(￿0)) ￿ ￿￿0[ U(1) ￿ fU(￿0) + (1 ￿ ￿0) U
0(￿0)g ] ; p(￿0) = 1
with the corresponding complementary slackness conditions at the boundaries. These
conditions characterize the optimal monitoring function p(￿). Note that the right-
hand side of (41) is independent of ^ p, since U(1); U(￿0), U0(￿0) are all values
corresponding to the optimal program. Since b0(p) is strictly positive and increasing
in p, the solution of (41) is unique for each ￿.
The result we want is:
Theorem A.1. If b0(p) > 0 8p 2 [0;1], then there is ￿a; ￿b with 0 < ￿a ￿ ￿b < ￿
￿
such that
(i) p(￿) = 0 in the interval [0;￿a)
(ii) p(￿) = 0 in the interval (￿b;￿
￿].
(iii) If b0(0) is not too large, then p(￿) > 0 for some ￿ 2 [￿a;￿b].
Proof of (i): U(￿) and U0(￿) are clearly non-negative, hence the right-hand side of
(41) is bounded above by ￿￿0[U(1)]. But this tends to 0 as ￿0 ! 0, and must fall
below b0(0) for ￿ > 0 small enough. Hence for small enough ￿ we must have p(￿) = 0.
Proof of (ii): Suppose there is ￿ ￿ such that (41) holds with strict inequality at p = 0
8￿ between ￿ ￿ and ￿
￿. Then in this range p(￿) = 0 and U(￿) is identical to U￿(￿) as
de￿ned in (3).
Di⁄erentiating (3), noting that U(1) =
g
r, and performing the necessary manipu-
lations we obtain











39As ￿ ! ￿
￿ the rhs of (42) converges to U(1), which implies that the rhs of the
second condition in (41) converges to 0. Since b0(0) is strictly positive, it follows that
for ￿ su¢ ciently close to ￿
￿, we must have p(￿) = 0.
Proof of (iii): Since the expression in (42) is strictly positive for ￿ < ￿
￿, the RHS of
(41) is strictly positive for all ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿) and therefore greater than b0 (0) for b0 (0)
su¢ ciently small.
￿
Theorem (5.1) in the text is a restatement of parts (i) and (ii) above.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. of Theorem (5.2): If a worker with ￿0 is observed to have failed to handle a





where ￿0 refers to the ￿rm￿ s belief about ￿ just prior to failure. If the ￿rm does not
observe a failure and has not been monitoring the worker, then it updates according
to
￿(e ￿0;t) =
e ￿0(e￿￿t + (1 ￿ e￿￿t)￿)
e ￿0 (1 ￿ e￿￿t)￿ + e￿￿t : (44)
A little manipulation establishes that






Solving for t gives condition (8).
40A.6 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Proof. The existence of the lower range follows directly from the proof in the base
case.
The existence of the monitoring range in the H-task is established in the text.
Setting ￿ = 1 in condition (22) proves that the upper end of this range is less than
1.
To prove the existence of upper no-monitoring range in the L-task, assume that
no such range exists. Then the transition between tasks occurs when
￿b ￿ ￿cl (1 ￿ ￿n) = g ￿ b ￿ ￿cm (1 ￿ ￿n) (46)
￿n =
￿(cm ￿ cl) ￿ g
￿(cm ￿ cl)
: (47)
Now consider a strategy of assigning a worker to the L-task and then promoting him
to the H-task and monitoring him until a crisis arises after which he either separates
or is known to be good and is not monitored. Consider the determination of ￿
￿ in
this case: Letting p = 1 ￿ e￿￿t1









































￿0 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿0)
or
￿0 = ￿
























(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿0)
￿0 + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿0)
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)cl￿
1 ￿ e￿(￿+r)t1
￿ + r














(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿0)e
￿rt1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0)cl￿
1 ￿ e￿(￿+r)t1
￿ + r
Note that e￿rt1 = e[￿￿t1] r
￿ = (1 ￿ p)
r
￿, which yields
= ￿0 (1 ￿ p)
r























(g + (cl ￿ cm)￿ ￿ b)
￿
￿(￿ + r)g ￿ rb
(￿ + r)
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿





b ￿ g ￿ (cl ￿ cm)￿
b ￿ (￿ + r)(cl ￿ cm)
:
It is readily veri￿ed that ￿
￿ > ￿n: Therefore, U (￿n;L;N) > U (￿n;H;M) =
U (￿n;L;M) which proves the existence of an upper no-monitoring zone.
42